Ivan Timofeev: Syria is about to find out if getting rid of Assad is enough to please Washington

The recent change in leadership in Syria raises questions about potential reforms of the US sanctions regime against Syria. Over the past two decades, Washington has imposed some of the most stringent restrictions against Syria. These include financial sanctions, extensive export controls, import bans, as well as visa and travel restrictions. However, the political transition now underway may be creating an environment conducive to easing sanctions pressure on Damascus. The minister of foreign affairs of the Syrian transitional government has called on the US to lift the sanctions. It’s highly likely that we will see a gradual easing of the restrictive measures. However, this process will be slow, and the legal frameworks underpinning unilateral US sanctions against Syria could remain in place for years or even decades, regardless of any political changes.

A country overwhelmed by sanctions

A comprehensive list of US claims against Syria was set out in 2003 in the “Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act” (SAA). These include: the support of organizations in the US that are considered terrorist groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah (Syria was designated a “state sponsor of terrorism” by Washington in 1979); the undermining of Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (Syrian troops withdrew from Lebanon in 2005); the development of medium- and short-range missiles, as well as chemical, and biological weapons; and the provision of aid to America’s adversaries. In line with the SAA, former US President George W. Bush invoked his powers under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and, in May 2004, through Executive Order 13338, restrictive measures were implemented against Syria. These included a ban on the export of military goods and dual-use items, restrictions on Syrian civil aviation’s access to US airspace, and the imposition of blocking financial sanctions against individuals linked to the Syrian government who contribute to its policies in the aforementioned issues. In 2005, Syria was added to the “Iran Nonproliferation Act,” later renamed the “Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act.” It imposed sanctions for violations of controls on the export to the country of dual-use goods, including those that can be used to create missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

The sanctions regime initiated by Bush was later complemented by additional executive orders. In 2006, following the assassination in early 2005 of then-Prime Minister of Lebanon Rafic Hariri, financial sanctions were expanded (Executive Order 13399). By 2008, corruption became a basis for imposing sanctions against specific Syrian individuals (Executive Order 13460). In 2011, concerns over human rights violations and the suppression of the opposition led to further sanctions (Executive Orders 13572 and 13573). Alongside these blocking sanctions against Syrian officials and associated entities, US investments in Syria were also prohibited, as were the export or re-export of services to Syria, and any deals involving oil and petroleum products of Syrian origin (Executive Order 13582).

In 2012, human rights abuses and the use of digital surveillance systems against opposition members were added to the list of grounds for imposing sanctions (Executive Order 13606). A legal mechanism was also created to impose financial sanctions on individuals from third countries who helped Iran and Syria circumvent sanctions (Executive Order 13608). Finally, in 2019, the US Congress enacted the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, introducing restrictive measures on transactions with the Central Bank of Syria and establishing a new legal framework to impose sanctions against individuals from third countries (including Russia) who collaborated with the Syrian regime.

The US imposed sanctions not only against Syria but also against its own allies. For instance, in 2019, then-President Donald Trump declared a state of emergency and created a legal mechanism for imposing sanctions against Turkish and other individuals engaged in “actions or policies that further threaten the peace, security, stability, or territorial integrity of Syria” (Executive Order 13894). Ultimately, the US has imposed some of the harshest penalties on Syria. In addition to export and import controls, virtually all key Syrian companies and enterprises in the energy, transportation, finance, industry, and technology sectors were under blocking sanctions. The EU, UK, Canada, and other Western countries have imposed their own sanctions against Syria.

Is an end soon in sight?

Meanwhile, Damascus has actively sought ways to adapt to its situation, significantly relying on cooperation with Iran and Russia – two countries that have also found themselves under increasing sanctions pressure from Washington and its allies.

But now the change of government in Syria creates certain political prerequisites for easing the sanctions. One of the initial measures is the introduction of exceptions to Washington’s financial sanctions through General License No. 24, issued by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) on January 6. This license allows transactions with Syrian governing institutions concerning the supply, storage, and sale of energy resources and electricity, as well as money transfers for personal and non-profit purposes. These changes represent significant concessions; however, the license is temporary and is valid until July. Its renewal may depend on various political conditions. Importantly, this license does not lift existing blocking sanctions or trade restrictions. Formally, US sanctions against Syria remain fully in place.

It is highly likely that, in the near future, American authorities will continue to make use of temporary licenses while maintaining the legal frameworks established by federal laws and executive orders. These orders may be repealed only when Washington is confident in a substantial and irreversible shift in Syria’s political course and that it aligns with US interests. Given the complexity of changing federal laws, they may remain in effect for an extended period even if there is a fundamental shift in Syria’s external and internal policies, despite the president’s authority to suspend them.

In addition to making exceptions under the general license just introduced, the US may also consider, as a form of incentive, removing certain Syrian government entities or companies from its list of blocked individuals. However, this process is expected to be gradual. Conditions for lifting the blocking sanctions might include a presence of American observers in the management systems of these organizations, their accountability to US authorities, and other oversight mechanisms. We may also anticipate some easing of controls on exports to Syria, particularly regarding goods and services without dual-use potential.

In any case, the process of lifting sanctions is expected to be cautious, and closely linked to the fulfillment of America’s political demands – if these requirements are not met, the sanctions will be quickly reinstated. Either way, sanctions will remain an important tool for influencing the political course of Syria’s new government.